Corruption, Competition, and Contracts : A Model of Vote Buying /
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We f...
প্রধান লেখক: | |
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অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
ভাষা: | English |
প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2006.
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মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2006/011 |
বিষয়গুলি: | |
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |