Monitoring and Commitment in Bank Lending Behavior /
The paper proposes a theoretical argument on the nature of bank lending, based on the idea that, through commitment and monitoring, banks overcome basic informational asymmetries with borrowers. By bringing together loan commitment theories and credit rationing theories, the paper shows that, within...
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| Formáid: | IRIS |
| Teanga: | English |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2005.
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| Sraith: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2005/222 |
| Rochtain ar líne: | Full text available on IMF |
| Achoimre: | The paper proposes a theoretical argument on the nature of bank lending, based on the idea that, through commitment and monitoring, banks overcome basic informational asymmetries with borrowers. By bringing together loan commitment theories and credit rationing theories, the paper shows that, within a framework of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers and under costly termination of lending arrangements, commitment may explain the accumulation of nonperforming loans by banks. Two additional results follow: (i) that banks favor borrowers with well-known production functions and long-term credit history; and (ii) that interest rate spreads may be large if significant market imperfections prevail. |
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| Cur síos ar an mír: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Cur síos fisiciúil: | 1 online resource (34 pages) |
| Formáid: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Rochtain: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |