On the Viability of Conditional Assistance Programs /

Economic adjustment and reform programs, including those supported by international financial institutions (IFIs), must cope with informational asymmetries and special interest politics. This presents a particularly serious issue when IFIs make structural economic reforms a condition for providing e...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Mayer, Wolfgang
Autres auteurs: Mourmouras, Alex
Format: Revue
Langue:English
Publié: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2005.
Collection:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2005/121
Accès en ligne:Full text available on IMF
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520 3 |a Economic adjustment and reform programs, including those supported by international financial institutions (IFIs), must cope with informational asymmetries and special interest politics. This presents a particularly serious issue when IFIs make structural economic reforms a condition for providing economic assistance. This paper examines what conditions must be satisfied to make conditional assistance programs viable; that is, to ensure that the assistancereceiving government not only takes the assistance but also implements reforms, without compromising the country's political stability and the IFI's financial integrity. It is pointed out that tightly budgeted conditional assistance programs never bring about reforms, that the IFI's cost of viable programs rises with the dependence of the government on domestic interest groups, and that unconditional assistance might be viable when conditional assistance is not. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Mourmouras, Alex. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2005/121 
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