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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451860788
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Beetsma, Roel.
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|a Implementing the Stability and Growth Pact :
|b Enforcement and Procedural Flexibility /
|c Roel Beetsma, Xavier Debrun.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2005.
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|a 1 online resource (34 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The paper analyzes some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greater "procedural" flexibility in the Pact's implementation may improve welfare. Procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply judgment on underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality measures. Budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy; therefore, better monitoring and greater transparency would increase the benefits from procedural flexibility. Overall, a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending, and increase high-quality outlays.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Debrun, Xavier.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2005/059
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/059/001.2005.issue-059-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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