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01804cas a2200253 a 4500 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451860610
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Roubini, Nouriel.
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|a 'Rules of Thumb' for Sovereign Debt Crises /
|c Nouriel Roubini, Paolo Manasse.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2005.
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|a 1 online resource (32 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper contains an empirical investigation of the set of economic and political conditions that are associated with a likely occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. We use a new statistical approach (Binary Recursive Tree) that allows us to derive a collection of "rules of thumb" that help identify the typical characteristics of defaulters. We find that not all crises are equal: they differ depending on whether the government faces insolvency, illiquidity, or various macroeconomic risks. We also characterize the set of fundamentals that can be associated with a relatively "risk free" zone. This classification is important for discussing appropriate policy options to prevent crises and improve response time and prediction.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Manasse, Paolo.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2005/042
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/042/001.2005.issue-042-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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