Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs /

In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are reveale...

Volledige beschrijving

Bibliografische gegevens
Hoofdauteur: Mody, Ashoka
Andere auteurs: Kim, Se-Jik
Formaat: Tijdschrift
Taal:English
Gepubliceerd in: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004.
Reeks:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/235
Online toegang:Full text available on IMF
LEADER 02077cas a2200253 a 4500
001 AALejournalIMF003314
008 230101c9999 xx r poo 0 0eng d
020 |c 5.00 USD 
020 |z 9781451875683 
022 |a 1018-5941 
040 |a BD-DhAAL  |c BD-DhAAL 
100 1 |a Mody, Ashoka. 
245 1 0 |a Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs /  |c Ashoka Mody, Se-Jik Kim. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2004. 
300 |a 1 online resource (29 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Kim, Se-Jik. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2004/235 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/235/001.2004.issue-235-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library