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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451875416
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Morris, JoAnne.
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|a Central Bank Governance :
|b A Survey of Boards and Management /
|c JoAnne Morris, Tonny Lybek.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2004.
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|a 1 online resource (53 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper identifies issues to consider when designing the structure, size, and composition of the governing boards and management of a central bank. While central bank autonomy and accountability are generally accepted as good practice, there is less consensus regarding the structure, size, and composition of the governing bodies. This paper surveys 101 central bank laws covering 113 countries and classifies the governance structure according to degree of autonomy, functions performed, size, composition, appointment procedures, and terms of the members. The paper concludes that an appropriate balance must be struck between the functions of the governing entities, simplicity, and country specific factors. The functions of the various bodies follow logically if a greater appreciation exists for the type of autonomy delegated to the central bank.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Lybek, Tonny.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2004/226
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/226/001.2004.issue-226-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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