Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap : The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank /
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This...
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| 格式: | 雜誌 |
| 語言: | English |
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Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| 叢編: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/162 |
| 在線閱讀: | Full text available on IMF |