Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap : The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank /
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This...
| Main Author: | Jeanne, Olivier |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Svensson, Lars |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/162 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
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