Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap : The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank /
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This...
Hoofdauteur: | Jeanne, Olivier |
---|---|
Andere auteurs: | Svensson, Lars |
Formaat: | Tijdschrift |
Taal: | English |
Gepubliceerd in: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
|
Reeks: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/162 |
Online toegang: | Full text available on IMF |
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