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|z 9781451857900
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Jeanne, Olivier.
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|a Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap :
|b The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank /
|c Olivier Jeanne, Lars Svensson.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2004.
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|a 1 online resource (44 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to a depreciation of its currency and an exchange rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation. This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson's Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Svensson, Lars.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2004/162
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/162/001.2004.issue-162-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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