Country Insurance /
In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The conseq...
| Autor principal: | Levy Yeyati, Eduardo |
|---|---|
| Altres autors: | Cordella, Tito |
| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
|
| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/148 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
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