Country Insurance /
In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The conseq...
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| Kolejni autorzy: | |
| Format: | Czasopismo |
| Język: | English |
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Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| Seria: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/148 |
| Dostęp online: | Full text available on IMF |
| Streszczenie: | In this paper, we examine how the presence of country insurance schemes affects policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country insurance, however, hinge on the nature of the reforms being considered: "buffering" reforms, aimed at mitigating the cost of crises, could be partially substituted for, and ultimately discouraged by, insurance. By contrast, "enhancing" reforms that pay off more generously in the absence of a crisis are likely to be promoted. |
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| Deskrypcja: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Opis fizyczny: | 1 online resource (26 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Ograniczenie dostępu: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |