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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451854862
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Bartolini, Leonardo.
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|a Government Ponzi Games and Debt Dynamics Under Uncertainty /
|c Leonardo Bartolini, Carlo Cottarelli.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1991.
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|a 1 online resource (26 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a We investigate the conditions for sustainability of debt roll-over schemes under uncertainty. In contrast with the requirements identified in recent research, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability of such schemes is that the asymptotic interest rate on government debt be lower than the asymptotic growth rate of the economy, a natural extension of a familiar criterion in a deterministic framework. However, we also show that for realistic parameter values, Ponzi games that are sustainable in the long run may display explosive patterns over relatively long horizons. This may explain why governments may be reluctant to play Ponzi games even when they are feasible in the long run.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Cottarelli, Carlo.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1991/126
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1991/126/001.1991.issue-126-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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