Can Debt Crises Be Self-Fulfilling? /
Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enou...
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| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
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| Seri Bilgileri: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/099 |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |
| Özet: | Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enough other investors do so as well. This suggests that runs on the debt of a single borrower (such as the government) can be eliminated, and that self-fulfilling features are more plausible when articulated in a context in which externalities among many decentralized borrowers allow for economy-wide debt runs to occur. |
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| Diğer Bilgileri: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Fiziksel Özellikler: | 1 online resource (21 pages) |
| Materyal Türü: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Erişim: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |