Ambiguity, Transparency, and Institutional Strength /
Institutional transparency makes future contingencies more easily predictable for investors. Greater transparency can be achieved through vertical and horizontal integration of policy rules, which may result in lower Knightian uncertainty (ambiguity). In a model based on cumulative prospect theory,...
| Autor Principal: | Erbas, S. |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2004.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2004/115 |
| Subjects: | |
| Acceso en liña: | Full text available on IMF |
Títulos similares
-
Competition among Exchanges and Enforcement Policy /
por: Caglio, Cecilia
Publicado: (2013) -
Clusters As a Driving Engine for FDI /
por: Yehoue, Etienne
Publicado: (2005) -
Testing for Purchasing Power Parity in Cointegrated Panels /
por: Lyhagen, Johan
Publicado: (2007) -
A Noteon Debt Reduction and Echonomic Efficiency.
Publicado: (1990) -
Inflation News and Euro Area Inflation Expectations /
por: Garcia, Juan Angel
Publicado: (2018)