Japan's Distressed-Debt Market /

Sizable risk capital from outside may be necessary to accelerate Japan's corporate restructuring to replace the stock of impaired bank loans. To attract risk capital, impaired loans must find market-clearing prices. However, the asymmetry in the bid-ask prices faced by banks and distressed-debt...

詳細記述

書誌詳細
第一著者: Ohashi, Kazunari
その他の著者: Singh, Manmohan
フォーマット: 雑誌
言語:English
出版事項: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2004.
シリーズ:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2004/086
オンライン・アクセス:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Japan's Distressed-Debt Market /  |c Kazunari Ohashi, Manmohan Singh. 
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490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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520 3 |a Sizable risk capital from outside may be necessary to accelerate Japan's corporate restructuring to replace the stock of impaired bank loans. To attract risk capital, impaired loans must find market-clearing prices. However, the asymmetry in the bid-ask prices faced by banks and distressed-debt investors continues to stall efforts to create a liquid distressed-debt market. This paper asserts that the wedge between the prices faced by different participants is primarily a result of different valuation methods employed by banks and distressed-debt investors. On the one hand, banks do not recognize "maturity default" that results in banks rolling over impaired-loan accounts, effectively turning them into perpetual debt, which is expected to capture any upside potential for value. On the other hand, distressed-debt investors presently view their investments as equity stakes that require improved cash flows, unlike the buy-and-sell distressed-collateral market that existed in the mid-1990s. We suggest that bids from distressed-debt investors may not be as low as they are deemed by local banks and the asymmetry in prices may be reduced if banks value their claims as corporate equity. 
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700 1 |a Singh, Manmohan. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2004/086 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/086/001.2004.issue-086-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library