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|z 9781451859331
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|a 1018-5941
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|a Huang, Haizhou.
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|a Monetary Policies for Developing Countries :
|b The Role of Corruption /
|c Haizhou Huang, Shang-Jin Wei.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2003.
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|a 1 online resource (28 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper examines the role of corruption in the design of monetary policies for developing countries in a framework of fiscal and monetary interaction and obtains several interesting results. First, pegged exchange rates, currency boards, or dollarization, while often prescribed as a solution to the problem of a lack of credibility for developing countries, is typically not credible in countries with serious corruption. Second, the optimal degree of conservatism for a Rogoff (1985)-type central banker is an inverse function of the corruption level. Third, either an optimally designed inflation target or an optimal-conservative central banker is preferable to an exchange rate peg, currency board, or dollarization.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Wei, Shang-Jin.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2003/183
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/183/001.2003.issue-183-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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