Exchange Rate Appreciation As a Signal of a New Policy Stance /
It is shown in a game theoretic framework that it may pay off to signal a 'conservative' policy stance--giving a high priority to price stability--by appreciating the exchange rate. Such an appreciation demonstrates to domestic producers and more precisely to the trade union that the new p...
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| Formato: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1991.
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1991/032 |
| Acceso en liña: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | It is shown in a game theoretic framework that it may pay off to signal a 'conservative' policy stance--giving a high priority to price stability--by appreciating the exchange rate. Such an appreciation demonstrates to domestic producers and more precisely to the trade union that the new policy stance is meant to be serious. An example explores the welfare implication for the policy maker and the trade union. The empirical background of the paper refers to the monetary policy in Europe. It explains the occurrence of exchange rate commitments to the deutsche mark, with appreciated rates. |
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| descrición da copia: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descrición Física: | 1 online resource (20 pages) |
| Formato: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Acceso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |