Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? : Experimentation vs. Career Concerns /
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between an incumbent officeholder and the electorate, where the officeholder is initially uninformed about her ability. If officeholder effort and ability interact in the "production function" that determines performance in off...
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| Формат: | Журнал |
| Язык: | English |
| Опубликовано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2003.
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| Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2003/057 |
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| Online-ссылка: | Full text available on IMF |