Monetary Union in West Africa : Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why? /
We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union....
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| Tác giả khác: | , |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/226 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |