Monetary Union in West Africa : Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why? /

We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union....

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Masson, Paul
Άλλοι συγγραφείς: Debrun, Xavier, Pattillo, Catherine
Μορφή: Επιστημονικό περιοδικό
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Σειρά:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/226
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full text available on IMF