A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime /
Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelect...
| Hovedforfatter: | Sun, Yan |
|---|---|
| Format: | Tidsskrift |
| Sprog: | English |
| Udgivet: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
|
| Serier: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/212 |
| Online adgang: | Full text available on IMF |
Lignende værker
-
Exchange Rate Regime Choice /
af: Marion, Nancy
Udgivet: (1991) -
Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Historical Perspective /
af: Bordo, Michael
Udgivet: (2003) -
Exchange Rate Unification, the Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate, and Choice of Exchange Rate Regime : The Case of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Udgivet: (1999) -
A Model of Exchange Rate Regime Choice in the Transitional Economies of Central and Eastern Europe /
af: Klyuev, Vladimir
Udgivet: (2001) -
Exchange Rate Regime Transitions /
af: Masson, Paul
Udgivet: (2000)