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|z 9781451859829
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|a Giannini, Curzio.
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|a Bedfellows, Hostages, or Perfect Strangers? :
|b Global Capital Markets and the Catalytic Effect of IMF Crisis Lending /
|c Curzio Giannini, Carlo Cottarelli.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2002.
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|a 1 online resource (50 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a During the 1990s, the concept of "catalytic official finance" (COF) gained prominence in policy debates. The concept revolves around the idea that the propensity of investors to lend to a country increases when the IMF provides its "seal of approval"-backed up by only limited official financing-on the country's economic program. COF aims at avoiding, on the one hand, the massive use of public money to bail out private investors; on the other, the recourse to coercive bailing-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that COF, while possibly useful in other contexts, is less reliable when used to manage capital account crises.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Cottarelli, Carlo.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2002/193
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/193/001.2002.issue-193-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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