Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending : A Test /
We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived pro...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | , |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/181 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |