Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending : A Test /
We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived pro...
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| Outros Autores: | , |
| Formato: | Periódico |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado em: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Colecção: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/181 |
| Acesso em linha: | Full text available on IMF |
| Resumo: | We test for the existence of a moral hazard effect attributable to official crisis lending by analyzing the evolution of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets before and after the Russian crisis. The nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived probability of future crisis lending to emerging markets. In the presence of moral hazard, such an event should raise not only the level of spreads, but also the sensitivity with which spreads reflect fundamentals as well as their cross-country dispersion. We find strong evidence for all three effects. |
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| Descrição do item: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Descrição Física: | 1 online resource (55 pages) |
| Formato: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Acesso: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |