International Environmental Taxation in the Absence of Sovereignty /
Traditional public finance theory may be applied to the internalization of international environmental externalities. The policy constraint imposed by the absence of sovereign international government may be partially overcome through international environmental agreements. Instruments such as cost...
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| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1992.
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1992/104 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | Traditional public finance theory may be applied to the internalization of international environmental externalities. The policy constraint imposed by the absence of sovereign international government may be partially overcome through international environmental agreements. Instruments such as cost sharing, found in existing agreements, are generally unsophisticated. Two proposals entailing improved instruments are considered: (a) an international carbon tax, and (b) a global commons trust fund financed by earmarked excise taxes or charges. Political realities appear to preclude the early adoption of sophisticated international environmental taxes, but modest improvements in the design and implementation of existing instruments may be feasible. |
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| Item Description: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (37 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Access: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |