On National or Supranational Objectives : Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs /

Central governments or the international community at large are concerned about subnational service delivery. The design of targeted expenditure programs features frequently in central efforts to redistribute infrastructure and social spending or assure minimum standards. These programs are typicall...

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Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile nagusia: Zhang, Ping
Beste egile batzuk: Ahmad, Ehtisham, Tandberg, Eivind
Formatua: Aldizkaria
Hizkuntza:English
Argitaratua: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Saila:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/209
Sarrera elektronikoa:Full text available on IMF
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100 1 |a Zhang, Ping. 
245 1 0 |a On National or Supranational Objectives :   |b Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs /  |c Ping Zhang, Eivind Tandberg, Ehtisham Ahmad. 
264 1 |a Washington, D.C. :  |b International Monetary Fund,  |c 2002. 
300 |a 1 online resource (30 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a Central governments or the international community at large are concerned about subnational service delivery. The design of targeted expenditure programs features frequently in central efforts to redistribute infrastructure and social spending or assure minimum standards. These programs are typically financed by the center, often with external assistance, but are implemented at the subnational level, which may not have incentives to spend the resources as intended by the center or donors. We discuss mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of targeted public expenditure programs, modeling the interaction between different levels of government as a dynamic game. An incentive structure could be designed that compelled local governments to truthfully reveal their ability to implement national programs in a cost-effective manner and to exert the effort required to maximize the expected benefits. The models have direct policy relevance in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), where donor-financed resources are used for poverty-reduction at the local level, or in large countries such as China, where there is an effort to redirect social and infrastructure spending to particular regions. 
538 |a Mode of access: Internet 
700 1 |a Ahmad, Ehtisham. 
700 1 |a Tandberg, Eivind. 
830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2002/209 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/209/001.2002.issue-209-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library