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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451853872
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni.
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|a Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs /
|c Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Tito Cordella.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2002.
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|a 1 online resource (24 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing.".
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Government Policy
|2 imf
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|a Provision and Effects Of Welfare Program
|2 imf
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|a WP
|2 imf
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|a Cordella, Tito.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2002/115
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/115/001.2002.issue-115-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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