Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs /
When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resour...
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| Формат: | Журнал |
| Мова: | English |
| Опубліковано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Серія: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/115 |
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| Онлайн доступ: | Full text available on IMF |
| Резюме: | When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing.". |
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| Опис примірника: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Фізичний опис: | 1 online resource (24 pages) |
| Формат: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Доступ: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |