Candidate Entry, Screening, and the Political Budget Cycle /
We investigate whether private information about citizens' competence in political office can be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests; only in the former case can entry be reve...
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| Tác giả khác: | |
| Định dạng: | Tạp chí |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Được phát hành: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2002.
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| Loạt: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2002/048 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | Full text available on IMF |