Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions /
We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central.
| Egile nagusia: | Castellani, Francesca |
|---|---|
| Beste egile batzuk: | Debrun, Xavier |
| Formatua: | Aldizkaria |
| Hizkuntza: | English |
| Argitaratua: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| Saila: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/205 |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | Full text available on IMF |
Antzeko izenburuak
-
Central Bank Independence : Issues and Experience.
Argitaratua: (1991) -
Central Bank Independence : A Free Lunch? /
nork: Debelle, Guy
Argitaratua: (1996) -
The Case for an Independent Fiscal Institution in Japan /
nork: Kopits, George
Argitaratua: (2016) -
Central Bank Independence and Transparency : Evolution and Effectiveness /
nork: Crowe, Christopher
Argitaratua: (2008) -
Credibility of Central Bank Independence Revisited /
nork: Valila, Timo
Argitaratua: (1999)