Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions /
We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central.
Hlavní autor: | Castellani, Francesca |
---|---|
Další autoři: | Debrun, Xavier |
Médium: | Časopis |
Jazyk: | English |
Vydáno: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
Edice: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/205 |
On-line přístup: | Full text available on IMF |
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