Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions /

We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central.

Bibliografski detalji
Glavni autor: Castellani, Francesca
Daljnji autori: Debrun, Xavier
Format: Žurnal
Jezik:English
Izdano: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Serija:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/205
Online pristup:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions /  |c Francesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun. 
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490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
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500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
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520 3 |a We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central. 
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700 1 |a Debrun, Xavier. 
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