Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions /
We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central.
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/205 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
| Summary: | We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central. |
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| Item Description: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (37 pages) |
| Format: | Mode of access: Internet |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |
| Access: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |