Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America During the 1990s /

This paper reviews central banks' legal reform in Latin America during the 1990s and discusses the status of central bank independence in the region. Based on this information, it builds a simplified index of central bank independence which, in addition to the commonly used criteria of politica...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jacome, Luis
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/212
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
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245 1 0 |a Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America During the 1990s /  |c Luis Jacome. 
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300 |a 1 online resource (41 pages) 
490 1 |a IMF Working Papers 
500 |a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
500 |a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required 
506 |a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students 
520 3 |a This paper reviews central banks' legal reform in Latin America during the 1990s and discusses the status of central bank independence in the region. Based on this information, it builds a simplified index of central bank independence which, in addition to the commonly used criteria of political and economic independence, incorporates provisions of central banks' financial autonomy, accountability, and lender-of-last-resort. The paper finds a moderate negative correlation between increased central bank independence and inflation during 1999-2001 in 14 Latin American countries. Dissagregating the index, the same analysis suggests that economic independence is the key component driving the observed negative correlation between legal central bank independence and inflation. 
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830 0 |a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;  |v No. 2001/212 
856 4 0 |z Full text available on IMF  |u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/212/001.2001.issue-212-en.xml  |z IMF e-Library