Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences /
This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker...
| 第一著者: | Ruge-Murcia, Francisco |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | 雑誌 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| シリーズ: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/161 |
| オンライン・アクセス: | Full text available on IMF |
類似資料
-
Asymmetric Effects of Economic Activityon Inflation : Evidence and Policy Implications /
著者:: Laxton, Douglas
出版事項: (1994) -
Intervention Under Inflation Targeting : When Could It Make Sense? /
著者:: Hofman, David
出版事項: (2020) -
Inflation Targeting Under Potential Output Uncertainty /
著者:: Gaiduch, Victor
出版事項: (2000) -
Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Policy Credibility.
出版事項: (2009) -
Balance of Payments Crises Under Inflation Targeting /
著者:: Li, Shujing
出版事項: (2007)