Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences /
This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker...
| Glavni avtor: | Ruge-Murcia, Francisco |
|---|---|
| Format: | Revija |
| Jezik: | English |
| Izdano: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| Serija: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/161 |
| Online dostop: | Full text available on IMF |
Podobne knjige/članki
-
Asymmetric Effects of Economic Activityon Inflation : Evidence and Policy Implications /
od: Laxton, Douglas
Izdano: (1994) -
Intervention Under Inflation Targeting : When Could It Make Sense? /
od: Hofman, David
Izdano: (2020) -
Inflation Targeting Under Potential Output Uncertainty /
od: Gaiduch, Victor
Izdano: (2000) -
Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Policy Credibility.
Izdano: (2009) -
Balance of Payments Crises Under Inflation Targeting /
od: Li, Shujing
Izdano: (2007)