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01656cas a2200253 a 4500 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451981773
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Miller, Marcus.
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|a Contacts, Credibility and Common Knowledge :
|b Their Influenceon Inflation Convergence /
|c Marcus Miller, Alan Sutherland.
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| 264 |
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 1992.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (24 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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| 500 |
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a In this paper three possible reasons are examined for a sluggish inflation response to a hard currency peg. Models of overlapping wage contracts are analyzed and shown to generate little inertia. This contrasts with the effects of government credibility and the speed of private sector learning, which are shown to have a major impact on the speed of inflation adjustment. But even if individual agents believe the government will not devalue, it is shown that inflation inertia can still arise if these expectations are not common knowledge.
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| 538 |
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Sutherland, Alan.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 1992/026
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1992/026/001.1992.issue-026-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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