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01809cas a2200253 a 4500 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451849462
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Marquez, Robert.
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|a Competition Among Regulators /
|c Robert Marquez, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2001.
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|a 1 online resource (24 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper shows that competition among regulators reduces regulatory standards relative to a centralized solution. It suggests that a central regulator is more likely to emerge for homogeneous and financially integrated countries. The paper proves these results in a model where regulators concerned with their banking system's stability and efficiency and with their banks' profitability set their regulatory policy non-cooperatively. Externalities in bank regulation make the independent solution collectively inefficient. These externalities and the benefits of centralized regulation increase with financial integration, while the costs associated with the loss of independence decrease with the homogeneity of the countries involved.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2001/073
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/073/001.2001.issue-073-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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