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01694cas a2200253 a 4500 |
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AALejournalIMF001487 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451850888
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a De Blasio, Guido.
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|a Resources and Incentives to Reform :
|b A Model and Some Evidence on Sub-Saharan African Countries /
|c Guido De Blasio, A. Dalmazzo.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2001.
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|a 1 online resource (43 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a The paper models the incentives for a self-interested government to implement "good policies". While good policies lead to investment and growth, they reduce the government's ability to increase supporters' consumption. The model predicts that resource abundance is conductive to poor policies and, consequently, to low investment. The implications of the model are broadly supported by evidence on sub-Saharan African countries. In particular, countries that are rich in natural resources tend to have lower institutional quality and worse macroeconomic and trade policies.
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a Dalmazzo, A.
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2001/086
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/086/001.2001.issue-086-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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