Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks : Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail /
Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While...
主要作者: | Kaufman, George |
---|---|
其他作者: | Seelig, Steven |
格式: | 雜誌 |
語言: | English |
出版: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
叢編: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/083 |
在線閱讀: | Full text available on IMF |
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