Post-Resolution Treatment of Depositors At Failed Banks : Implications for the Severity of Banking Crises, Systemic Risk, and too-Big-To-Fail /

Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While...

Deskribapen osoa

Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egile nagusia: Kaufman, George
Beste egile batzuk: Seelig, Steven
Formatua: Aldizkaria
Hizkuntza:English
Argitaratua: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Saila:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/083
Sarrera elektronikoa:Full text available on IMF
Deskribapena
Gaia:Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors' access to their claims is delayed or "frozen." While the sources and implications of losses at resolution have been analyzed previously, the sources and implications of losses after resolution have received little attention. This paper examines the causes of delayed depositors' access to their funds at resolved banks, describes how the FDIC provides immediate access, reports on a special survey of access practices in other countries, and analyzes the costs and benefits of delayed access in terms of both the effects on market discipline and depositor pressure to protect all deposits.
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Deskribapen fisikoa:1 online resource (23 pages)
Formatua:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Sartu:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students