Price Controls and Electoral Cycles /
This paper studies the interactions between electoral considerations and the imposition of price controls by opportunistic policymakers. The analysis shows that a policy cycle emerges in which price controls are imposed in periods leading to the election, and removed immediately afterwards. The shap...
Главный автор: | Asilis, Carlos |
---|---|
Другие авторы: | Agenor, Pierre-Richard |
Формат: | Журнал |
Язык: | English |
Опубликовано: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
1993.
|
Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 1993/089 |
Online-ссылка: | Full text available on IMF |
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