On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance /

This paper examines the implications of central bank independence for equilibrium macroeconomic performance. The focus is on institutional arrangements governing financial relationships between central banks and ministries of finance, in the presence of competing objectives and constraints across in...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Musalem Borrero, Alberto
Μορφή: Επιστημονικό περιοδικό
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Σειρά:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2001/019
Διαθέσιμο Online:Full text available on IMF