On the Long and Short of Central Bank Independence, Policy Coordination, and Economic Performance /
This paper examines the implications of central bank independence for equilibrium macroeconomic performance. The focus is on institutional arrangements governing financial relationships between central banks and ministries of finance, in the presence of competing objectives and constraints across in...
| Hovedforfatter: | Musalem Borrero, Alberto |
|---|---|
| Format: | Tidsskrift |
| Sprog: | English |
| Udgivet: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2001.
|
| Serier: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2001/019 |
| Online adgang: | Full text available on IMF |
Lignende værker
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Monetary Policy Coordination and the Role of Central Banks /
af: Mohan, Rakesh
Udgivet: (2014) -
The Long and the Short of It
af: Dane -
Central Bank Independence : Issues and Experience.
Udgivet: (1991) -
Central Bank Independence : A Free Lunch? /
af: Debelle, Guy
Udgivet: (1996) -
Short-Versus Long-Term Credit and Economic Performance : Evidence from the WAEMU /
af: Gbenyo, Kodzo
Udgivet: (2010)