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01635cas a2200241 a 4500 |
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|c 5.00 USD
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|z 9781451843644
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|a 1018-5941
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|a BD-DhAAL
|c BD-DhAAL
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|a Disyatat, Piti.
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|a Currency Crises and Foreign Reserves :
|b A Simple Model /
|c Piti Disyatat.
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b International Monetary Fund,
|c 2001.
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource (24 pages)
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
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|a Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students
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|a This paper addresses the important question of how far a government will run down its stock of foreign reserves in a defense of a fixed exchange rate. An optimizing model of currency crisis is presented in which the decision of whether or not to borrow in a defense of a peg is explicitly analyzed. The threshold level of reserves is then determined endogenously and shown to be a function of fundamental economic variables. The analysis also demonstrates how an increase in the level of reserves, a credit-rating upgrade, or the imposition of capital controls can remove the multiplicity of equilibria.
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| 538 |
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|a Mode of access: Internet
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|a IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
|v No. 2001/018
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| 856 |
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|z Full text available on IMF
|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/018/001.2001.issue-018-en.xml
|z IMF e-Library
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