Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard? /
The view that the IMF's financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on this hypothe...
| Yazar: | Phillips, Steven |
|---|---|
| Diğer Yazarlar: | Lane, Timothy |
| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Seri Bilgileri: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/168 |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |
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