Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard? /
The view that the IMF's financial support gives rise to moral hazard has become increasingly prominent in policy discussions, particularly following the 1995 Mexican crisis. This paper seeks to clarify a number of conceptual issues and bring some basic empirical evidence to bear on this hypothe...
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | Phillips, Steven |
|---|---|
| مؤلفون آخرون: | Lane, Timothy |
| التنسيق: | دورية |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| سلاسل: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/168 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | Full text available on IMF |
مواد مشابهة
-
Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
بواسطة: Phillips, Steven
منشور في: (2002) -
Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
بواسطة: Phillips, Steven
منشور في: (2003) -
Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
بواسطة: Phillips, Steven
منشور في: (2003) -
Moral Hazard : Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders? /
بواسطة: Phillips, Steven
منشور في: (2003) -
The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard) /
بواسطة: Jeanne, Olivier
منشور في: (2004)