Currency Boards, Credibility, and Macroeconomic Behavior /
Currency boards operate differently from standard pegs. The former exhibit greater currency stability and lower transaction costs, inflation, and nominal interest rates, but are limited in their use of devaluation. We extend Drazen and Masson's (1994) signaling model to consider the choice betw...
| Autor Principal: | Sy, Amadou |
|---|---|
| Outros autores: | Rivera-Batiz, Luis |
| Formato: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/097 |
| Acceso en liña: | Full text available on IMF |
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