Currency Boards, Credibility, and Macroeconomic Behavior /
Currency boards operate differently from standard pegs. The former exhibit greater currency stability and lower transaction costs, inflation, and nominal interest rates, but are limited in their use of devaluation. We extend Drazen and Masson's (1994) signaling model to consider the choice betw...
| Yazar: | Sy, Amadou |
|---|---|
| Diğer Yazarlar: | Rivera-Batiz, Luis |
| Materyal Türü: | Dergi |
| Dil: | English |
| Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Seri Bilgileri: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/097 |
| Online Erişim: | Full text available on IMF |
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