Currency Boards, Credibility, and Macroeconomic Behavior /
Currency boards operate differently from standard pegs. The former exhibit greater currency stability and lower transaction costs, inflation, and nominal interest rates, but are limited in their use of devaluation. We extend Drazen and Masson's (1994) signaling model to consider the choice betw...
| Main Author: | Sy, Amadou |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Rivera-Batiz, Luis |
| Format: | Journal |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/097 |
| Online Access: | Full text available on IMF |
Similar Items
-
Testing the Credibility of the Belgian Hard Currency Policy /
by: Koen, Vincent
Published: (1991) -
Currency Boards : Issues and Experiences /
by: Bennett, Adam
Published: (1994) -
Currency Boards : The Ultimate Fix? /
by: Ghosh, Atish
Published: (1998) -
Local Currency Debt Markets in the West African Economic and Monetary Union /
by: Sy, Amadou
Published: (2007) -
Dual Currency Boards : A Proposal for Currency Stability /
by: Oppers, S.
Published: (2000)