Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial Crises /

Financial crises are endogenized through corporate and interbank market institutions. Single-bank financing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market. With private information about one's own solvency, the best illiquid banks will not borrow but rather will liquidate some premature...

Mô tả đầy đủ

Chi tiết về thư mục
Tác giả chính: Huang, Haizhou
Tác giả khác: Xu, Chenggang
Định dạng: Tạp chí
Ngôn ngữ:English
Được phát hành: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000.
Loạt:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/092
Truy cập trực tuyến:Full text available on IMF
Miêu tả
Tóm tắt:Financial crises are endogenized through corporate and interbank market institutions. Single-bank financing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market. With private information about one's own solvency, the best illiquid banks will not borrow but rather will liquidate some premature assets. The withdrawals of the best banks from the interbank market may lead more solvent but illiquid banks to withdraw from the market, until the interbank market collapses. However, multi-bank financing leads to a separating equilibrium in the interbank market. Thus, bank runs are limited to illiquid and insolvent banks, and idiosyncratic shocks never trigger a contagious bank run.
Mô tả sách:<strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
<strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required
Mô tả vật lý:1 online resource (32 pages)
Định dạng:Mode of access: Internet
số ISSN:1018-5941
Truy cập:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students