Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly /
This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free...
| Autor principal: | Tan, Ling |
|---|---|
| Format: | Revista |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicat: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
|
| Col·lecció: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/065 |
| Accés en línia: | Full text available on IMF |
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