Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly /
This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free...
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
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| বিন্যাস: | পত্রিকা |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Washington, D.C. :
International Monetary Fund,
2000.
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| মালা: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
No. 2000/065 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | Full text available on IMF |
| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest. |
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| উপাদানের বিবরণ: | <strong>Off-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required <strong>On-Campus Access:</strong> No User ID or Password Required |
| দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 1 online resource (21 pages) |
| বিন্যাস: | Mode of access: Internet |
| আইএসএসএন: | 1018-5941 |
| প্রবেশাধিকার: | Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students |