Deposit-Refundon Labor : A Solution to Equilibrium Unemployment? /

The paper studies the employment effects of a deposit-refund scheme on labor in a simple search-theoretic model of the labor market. It is shown that if a firm pays a deposit to the government when it fires a worker, to be refunded when it employs the same or another worker, the vacancy rate increas...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Heijdra, Ben
Other Authors: Ligthart, Jenny
Format: Journal
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2000.
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2000/009
Online Access:Full text available on IMF
Description
Summary:The paper studies the employment effects of a deposit-refund scheme on labor in a simple search-theoretic model of the labor market. It is shown that if a firm pays a deposit to the government when it fires a worker, to be refunded when it employs the same or another worker, the vacancy rate increases and the unemployment rate declines. However, the scheme introduces rigidities in the labor market that may be undesirable in countries wanting to liberalize their labor markets.
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Physical Description:1 online resource (19 pages)
Format:Mode of access: Internet
ISSN:1018-5941
Access:Electronic access restricted to authorized BRAC University faculty, staff and students